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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
PARENT AND CM - LIABILITY OF PARENT TO CHILD FOR PER-
SONAL INJURY - EFFECT OF FACT THAT PARENT IS INSURED. -
Plaintiff, sixteen year old daughter of one of defendants, sought to
recover damages for the negligent injury to her by her father in
the operation of his own bus under a contract with the school board
for the carriage of school children. The indemnity company, with
which the father and school board had a policy, was joined in the
action of assumpsit. The policy contained a clause to the effect
that the obligations of the policy constituted direct liability to the
person injured "whether an action for damages is brought against
the named assured alone or jointly with the company." 1  Held:
The directed verdict for defendants was error; new trial awarded.
Lusk v. Lusk.?
The decision in this case at least qualifies for West Virginia a
rule that has been adhered to almost without dissent. The great
weight of authority is that an unemancipated minor may not sue
a parent for negligence.8 Though the action was in assumpit, the
court's language is more applicable to a tort action. The holding,
therefore, seems to be inconsistent with that in the recent case of
Securo v. Securo. The court, however, distinguishes that decision
on the ground that insurance is present in the instant case. Of
various reasons assigned for this general rule of parental immunity,'
the court here adopts that of the "family exchequer." Since the
family funds are not involved, because it is the insurance company
that "pays", the suit is allowed. With one exception,' courts in
the United States take a contrary view, and hold that insurance in
'LSee reproduction of this form of provision in Criss v. Guaranty Co., 105
W. Va. 380, 142 S. E. 849 (1928).
'166 S. E. 538 (W. Va., 1932), rehearing denied, Dec. 7, 1932.
'Notes (1924) 31 A. L. R. 1157 and (1931) 71 A. L. R. 1071.; Kelly v.
Kelly, 158 S. C. 517, 155 S. E. 888 (1930); Trudell v. Leatherly, 212 Cal.
678, 300 Pac. 7 (1931).
'110 W. Va. 1, 156 S. E. 750 (1931). Minor 'unemancipated child sued
parent for negligent injury in the latter's car. The court, sustaining a de-
murrer to the declaration, said, "It is better that an occasional wrong should
go unrequited than that family life should be subjected to the disrupting
efect of such suits."
5These reasons, collected in a very able article by Professor McCurdy,
Torts between Persons in Domestic Itelation (1930) 43 HA v. L. REv. 1030,
1056, are: (1) Danger of fraud by child in suing after majority. (2) Possibil-
ity of succession. (3) Family Exchequer. (4) Similarity of action to ono
between husband and wife. (5) Domestic tranquility. (6) Domestic govern-
ment. (7) Parental discipline and control.
'Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. Er. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930). Minor child,
working for his parent, sought damages for injury received while at work.
The parent carried employer's liability insurance, premiums of which were
calculated from the wage list. The court allowed a recovery, giving as its
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these cases makes no difference.' Only two reported cases have
reached a result similar to that of the instant case. One,8 a Canad-
ian case, was based on a broad statute. In the other,' the court
emphasized the fact that the child was emancipated."0
The court fails to consider the possibility of a recovery in ex-
cess of the amount of the policy. As to such excess the child is
pitted against the parent and the interests of the family, so that
all the reasons for parental immunity exist. There are other objec-
tions. The danger of fraud is so great that at least one state, in
"guest" cases, has prohibited suits except for intentional acts of
the operator of the car. There is the danger that unless a trust
fund is established for the child the parent will profit by his own
negligence. A third objection is the effect on insurance rates.
Policy holders, not the insurance company, pay for increased re-
coveries. The rule which excludes evidence of the fact of insurance
in negligence cases,' did not apply because of the joinder of the
insurance company; but the language of the court indicates
that in any action for negligence between parent and child, the
fact of insurance may be shown regardless of whether or not the
indemnity company is joined.
It seems that in allowing the recovery the court misconceives
the terms of the contract in two aspects. First, under the estab-
lished rule of parental immunity,' the company must have assumed
that the policy did not cover injuries to the child of the insured.
The recovery appears to be similar to a recovery by the parent on
the policy, for injuries to his own person, since the amount recov-
main grounds: (1) a statute in the state which had been interpreted to allow
similar actions; (2) the presence of insurance; (3) the fact that plaintiff was
emincipated.
'Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N. W. 763 (1908); Small v.
Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118. S. E. 12 (1923); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich.
175, 211 N. W. 88, 52 A. L. R. 1118 (1926); Lund v. Olson, 183 M. 515,
237 N. W. 118 (1931); Conen v. Kraft, 41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N. E. 277
(1931), Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 AtL 498 (1930).
8Marchand v. Marchand, 27 Rev. Leg. 254 (1920), (1923) 4 D. L. R. 914.
Approved as to right of minor to sue, but reversed because conditions of
policy had not been complied with. See also Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Marchand, (1924) 4 D. L. R. 157. The case was reversed because the
parent's action tended toward fraud.
0 Supra n. 6.
10Cases indicate that where the child is emancipated at the time of the
injury, an action may be maintained. Taubert v. Taubert, wpra n. 7; Hew-
lett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L. R. A. 682 (1891); Goldstein
v. Goldstein, 4 N. J. Misc. 711, 134 Atl. 184 (1926); Small v. Morrison,
supra n. 7.
2Ky. Acts 1930, c. 85.12See Notes (1928) A. L. R. 1418 and (1931) 74 A. L. R. 849.
IsSupra n. 3 and 4.
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ered at least in part replaces money the parent must otherwise
expend for the child. Thus indemnity insurance against injuries
to third persons is made to serve the function of accident insurance
for the child. Second, under the terms of its contract, the insur-
ance company assumed the risk of liability which obviously was to
be determined independently of the existence of the contract. But
the court looks to the existence of this insurance contract as determi-
native of the primary liability. Thus liability under the contract
is controlled by the contract's existence rather than by its terms.
-PAr S. HUDINS.
TORTS - VIoL Tio OF STATUTE OR ORDINANCE AS PRIMA
FAciE NEGLIGENCE. - Plaintiff, a motorcycle officer, turned left
at an intersection from street A, passed to the right of a line of
automobiles that were waiting in the middle of street B for traffic
light to change, and was injured in attempting to pass between
the second car in line and defendant's automobile, parked at an
angle to the curb in violation of a municipal ordinance requiring
all motor vehicles to be parked parallel with the curb. It was
found that the plaintiff was without fault. Held: Defendant's
violation of the ordinance was prima facie neligence.'
There is general judicial adherence to the principle that the
violation of a statute enacted for the protection of others will af-
ford a right of recovery, when the violation was the natural and
proximate cause of an injury; 'but there is no uniformity as to
the legal effect of such conduct. A majority of the decisions hold
a violation is negligence per se,' a minority that it is prima facie
negligence, and in a few cases it is only evidence of negligence.'
In Kentucky the violation of an ordinance is not even evidence of
negligence.
'Oldfield v. Woodall, 166 S. E. 691 (W. Va., 1932).
2 U. S. Brewing Co. v. Stoltenberg, 211 Ill. 531, 71 N. E. 1081 (1904);
see citation in 20 R. C. L. 33. In a very recent case, State v. Cope, 167 S.
E. 456 (N. C., 1933), it was held that the intentional or willful violation of
a statute or ordinance, causing injury to another, is negligence that imports
criminal responsibility.
3 cRickard v. Flint, 114 N. Y. 222 (1889); Southern By. Co. v. Johnson,
151 Va. 345, 143 S. E. 887 (1928).
'Richmond Traction Co. v. Clarke, 101 Va. 382, 43 S. E. 618 (1903);
Murphy v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 285 Pa. 399, 132 Atl. 194 (1926).
"Ford's Adm'r. v. Paducah City Ry., 124 Ky. 488, 99 S. W. 355 (1907);
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dalton, 102 Ky. 290, 53 S. W. 431 (1897).
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